Studying elites is reasonable and meaningful for learning about all social systems, and, especially those in which the leading role of the only political party is implemented. According to this principle we find out that in a studied social system there is a social group that unlike other social groups has got a decisive influence or makes crucial decisions which form the character of the social system itself.
The Post-war Sovietization
The share of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazism and fascism in the Second World War was great and undisputed. People in every country in which the former Red Army walked in considered its arrival to be the act of liberation not the act of conquer. Of course, there had been a kind of historical experience and a tradition of mutual liaisons (different in Poland, different in Czechoslovakia), and, more or less a character of the political culture in these countries.
The Czech public responded to the act of liberation helpfully. On one hand a Slavic superpower (the Soviet Union was understood like this in Czechoslovakia then) was setting free the Slavic folk from the Nazi occupation (simply Germans then) and on the other hand there was a tradition understanding Slavism to be the bearer of humanity and democracy. In this perspective of traditionalism, in the time of the ending of the Second World War, the Soviet Union was considered to be “a trustful friend”, a country in which “tomorrow already means yesterday”, and a country-fighter for the freedom of nations. These attributes were emphasized not just in speeches of candidates for the position of “substitution elite”, but also in speeches of all important Czech and Slovak politicians of that time (E. Beneš, H. Ripka, J. Masaryk, V. Majer, B. Laušman etc.). This consensus facilitated forming the future “substitution elite” coming from Communists who were mostly members of a group founded at wartime in Moscow and who strived to get the trust of J. V. Stalin (K. Gottwald, J. Šverma, V. Kopecký, R. Slánský, Z. Nejedlý, Z. Fierlinger and others).
In this more or less euphoric atmosphere an anti-Nazi militarism fighter was assumed to be a protector of democracy, freedom and peace, i. e. all the universal human values. Furthermore, the Czech public was not familiar with the real situation in the Soviet Union, and, if an item of negative information appeared, the Czechs tended to excuse it because of an enormous suffering of the Russians caused by war, in which the Russian folk were to face the bestiality and crimes of the Hitler army. The more the Soviet Union was seen this way the better the image of a democratic and freedom-loving country influenced the awareness of the Czechs. Thus the Czech nation strived for the friendship of such a country, and the sovietization itself, which had just started, was welcome with the “mass ovation”.
This false awareness, being in most cases a political and life persuasion, enabled an efficient kind of propaganda which was accompanied by the foundation of the “substitution elite” glorifying the Soviet Union and using the significant markers – democracy, freedom and peace. The concept of the Soviet Union as the most democratic, the freest and the most peace-loving country in the world spread throughout Czechoslovakia. Public holidays, ceremonies, parades and political meetings were decorated with the photo of J. V. Stalin – “the great engine-driver of the locomotive of history” – just next to the photo of E. Beneš, the Czechoslovak president.
The personality of J. V. Stalin was a very good, supportive means to reach the position of the helpful substitution elite. Rudolf Bechyně, a distinguished politician of the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1939) and one of the leading politicians of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party wrote a letter directly to J. V. Stalin on 9th January 1945. This was also a sort of helpfulness to the Soviet influence, and the trustworthiness of those, who served willingly to the Soviet power elite, increased. It was not suspicious. Opinions stated below were typical not only of Czechoslovak Social Democrats but also of the wide public.
The following part of the letter is called “Memorandum” and the author is saying this: “Anyway, I came to the conclusion that the absolute sovereignty of a little nation and country belongs to the realm of conventional fictions. I experienced it thoroughly in the twenty years of our sovereignty. It is true that we decided independently about most parts of our lives. However, it is also true that powerful influences of foreign governments, cartels etc. affected us, directly or indirectly. Having been a minister, I experienced diplomatic interventions into our affairs, and it happened several times that we had to lay down our appropriate interests for the interests of more powerful countries. The sovereignty of a little nation and country is very relative. The example of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union is characterized by a trustful mutual friendship, which is based on natural influences of a big, mighty state union and on the roots in the wide public, because such a friendship never dies. I do not want the agreement only. I want mutual love which revives and gives everything without asking for more than it provides.”
- Bechyně also emphasized the Slavic solidarity in the following words:
“From Moscow a voice is just speaking to us, a voice that everyone, no matter if at home or abroad, understands. It is the voice of the Slavic solidarity. Modern Moscow has just given us an item of evidence how it understands the freedom of nations in the Soviet Union. Yes, we know that the theoretical as well as practical bearer of the Soviet national policy is Josef Stalin. Therefore I firmly believe that the Slavic solidarity as it is proclaimed in Moscow does not stand for the spiritual armour for political takeover of other Slavic nations. It is not an instrument of imperialistic expansion. This kind of modern Pan-Slavism does not endanger neither Slavic nor non-Slavic nations. On the contrary, it makes a great political power of all Slavs based on the mental platform of democracy, solidarity, freedom and development and at the same time it is able to protect freedom, democracy and development of all less and weaker nations.”
In the post-war time there were plenty of similar examples of such helpfulness. They were expressed in the “love of our trustful friend” and “reverence of our liberator”, which was meant really sincerely. The gradual learning of the Soviet antidemocratic reality warned from gullible trustfulness and illusions. On the contrary, there was a gradual process of a return to the national pride and self-confidence. The process of sovietization of the Czech society was losing a very important support – the helpfulness of the society. Thus the Czech substitution elite were getting into trouble even though after the February 1948 it was the power elite, but a substitution completely. Its situation was getting more and more complicated in late fifties. “The Soviet Model” was losing its credit in the Czech awareness, and so were the Czech power elite.
The Czech power elite, being led by Antonín Novotný since 1957, realized that in the Czech social and political atmosphere the disbelief of “the controlled” to “the controlling” was increasing. It was necessary to cover such a thing up, and do it as willing as possible in relation to the real power elite which were in Moscow.
The Awkward Situation
The subordination and substitution of the Czech political elite was the most visible on the attitudes of the members of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The decisions made in Moscow were accepted just with slight and unimportant modifications. Thus the changes in Moscow policy brought paradoxes for adherents of the servile dependence. The followers of Stalin’s policy (having been the most slavish in the fifties) were very surprised at the beginning of the sixties. Dogmatism and the cult of the personality of Stalin affected very much the possibilities of free scientific and scholarly studies, but especially the social studies. However, the cult of the personality of Stalin was criticized at the 20th summit of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the meaning of science as the production power was stressed there, and all these changes made Czech Communists declare these conclusions, at least. Thus a large number of Communists calling for the reform of the system was enabled to find connections with the Czech public that dogmatism and revolution, being understood as hatred or envy, had denounced.
In the social studies there were lots of reform Communists reflecting this possibility. In economy there were e. g. Ota Šik, Karel Kouba, Vladimír Kadlec; in historiography there were Josef Macek, Karel Kaplan, Jan Křen, Milan Hübl, Vilém Prečan; in philosophy there were Karel Kosík, Ivan Sviták, Milan Machovec, Robert Kalivoda; in law there were Zdeněk Mlynář, František Šamalík; in sociology there were Jaroslav Klofáč, Pavel Machonin, Miroslav Jodl and many others. As a result of this trend sociology, having been banned before, was restored.
Conservative and orthodox Stalinists were opposed by democratic opinions which were formed by scholars and teachers (members of the Czechoslovak Communist Party mostly). Thus they contributed to the situation which analogically reminded of the heretic attack of the Middle Ages that was reminded by F. Engels in his German War with a following notice: all revolution ideas aimed against feudalism must have stood for “mostly theological heresy”. And it was a kind of paradox because everything was enabled by Moscow decisions on science. The Czech substitution elite had to put up with it.
The spirit of hatred to the educated and refined, which had been present in the politics since the fifties, was to disappear a little at least because the meaning of science was increasing. And there was one more paradox because this trend made the Czech society democratize. The year 1968 resulted from these sources, and without any support from the “hard core” of the substitution elite. Their time was to come after the invasion of the Warsaw Pact into Czechoslovakia. They were ready to serve to their superiors in Moscow and settle the educated.
The beginning of 1968 (5th January) divided the substitution power elite into two groups at the plenary session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Mr. Antonín Novotný was dismissed and Mr. Alexander Dubček replaced him. Nevertheless, some of the methods of the substitution elite still worked and it was decided that the conclusions of this session would be kept secret from the public.
Some members of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party changed their opinions being influenced by the atmosphere in the society and by their own intellectual evolution. They were becoming heretic. They stopped being members of the substitution elite, which can be seen in their attitudes to the conclusions of the plenary session mentioned above. Prof. Jiří Hájek, the Minister of Education, was one of them. He wrote about the change in his mind: “I realized that in the place where Strahov still echoed it was necessary to tell the truth about what had concluded the January session. And we have to do more: it is needed to look back critically over all the post-war time and see all our mistakes. Such a process has been spreading throughout our society since the January session. The liaisons in the power hierarchy have to be changed, the man typifying a bureaucratic organ has to be replaced by a nice, good-looking man typifying the changing atmosphere – a new fresh breeze. A big part of our society is expecting a change and wants to share it. There has been Marx’s conflict of production powers and production conditions reflected in our society since Gottwald’s government gave up the Czechoslovak way of socialism and replaced it with the Soviet way. (Saying this it is necessary to think about the mistake of those who wanted to get faster to socialism and wanted to change the concept of socializing democracy into the concept of socialistic democracy, and contributed to the disappearance of democracy itself. I was one of them.) Why did we not realize the conflict when it arose? I think that we could not see it because of the beginning of the Cold War which was even emphasized with the complex of the Munich Agreement. This complex affected E. Beneš and J. Masaryk, too. And I want to repeat once again, I was present in the process of socialistic revolution and I explained partial conflicts to myself as necessary when establishing socialism.
Within the twenty years the conflict has influenced the feeling, the subconscious and eventually the awareness of all the society, it could be seen everywhere. Nowadays people are interested in what is happening around, the democratic forms are restored again.”
The most open and most comprehensive information was given by another member of the substitution power elite Josef Smrkovský. He published an article called What It Is About in the Labour Daily on 21st January 1968. He pointed out the connection between the replacement of the Secretary General and the necessity of removal of the bureaucratic style of work strongly affected by Moscow rules. He pointed out the necessity of redressing the injustice which had occurred in the past, and in many cases it had been at the instance of the Soviet elite. He emphasized the need to democratize not only the Czechoslovak Communist Party, but all the society. He understood the conclusions of the January session to be the beginning of the enlightening process which should have involved the solutions of the problems with the democratic instruments with regard to the “plurality” of rightful interests and needs of all the society“. And everything should have been done without any agreement from Moscow. The reform Communists also strived for cancellation of one form of bureaucratic type of work – cabinet politics. Smrkovský realized that the Czech public had not forgotten its democratic traditions. The interest in political culture, redress of injustice and return to the Czechoslovak way of socialism proved it very clearly.
As the interest in political information was increasing, journalists were made to inform readers in new ways and be much more interested in their readers’ opinions than ever before. All this was happening without an agreement from the members of the substitution elite (Indra, Bilak and others) which were losing their power and meaning gradually.
These questions were also solved by the Institute of Research of Public Opinion. It ran a research in 10th – 12th February 1968 in the Red Right Daily. The conclusions of the research were as follows: 41 % of readers of the Red Right Daily said that they read also other dailies regularly; 52 % said that they listened to the radio news at least once a day and 49 % watched the TV news every day. It meant that the observance of all mass media grew. Nevertheless, the real trust of readers in the truthfulness of the information was not verified then because the authors of the research were not yet encouraged enough.
The existence of researches of public opinion was an exotic element in totalitarian systems. Policy formation in such systems was considered to be a matter of minorities and their protectors only. Thus the enlightening process in Czechoslovakia could not be an unpleasant thing for the power elite in the Kremlin. Alexander Dubček was invited to Moscow very soon after being elected the Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. He knew that he would defend difficultly the democratization process when being surrounded by supporters of the totalitarian order. Despite being aware of this Dubček tried to do his best regarding different state traditions of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. He wrote the following about his attempt in his biography: “Brezhnev asked me to explain to him how I saw the situation in Czechoslovakia those days and what exact plans I had. Of course, I had got prepared for his questions in advance and spoke clearly mostly. First I tried to clear up historical and present conditions of our nations and what it would have meant if we would like to have socialism in such a country like Czechoslovakia, which had been industrialized before – or at least its western part. Our society had been for decades used to modern political institutions and political culture. I tried to explain to him that the existing political system did not comply with our conditions and that it would lead to increasing tension and conflicts, which resulted to the stagnation and crisis. Changes and restorations were necessary if the socialistic system in Czechoslovakia should work.
I avoided using the terms “reform” and “revision” because I really did not want to intensify the hostility of these dogmatic Marxists-Leninists. On the contrary, I kept using words like “restoration” and “revival” because I was assured that these words could not be linked with any “sinful” heresy, which could be reminded of from history. I obviously avoided citing Marx’s thoughts of Russia as an unsuitable country for experiencing socialism.
However, when watching those gloomy faces I realized that they were so stubborn that I could hardly be understood. Unlike early post-revolution efforts late Stalinism was typical of self-false arrogance to other countries. Stalin’s heirs just like their master believed that everything that was good for them had to be good for everyone. Being convinced this way they considered any rational argument to be absolutely useless.”
This Moscow “interview” took place at the end of January 1968 when the restoration process was at the very beginning and the democratic political culture was just shown within the frame of careful asking what was and what was not possible. This stage was exceeded at the beginning of March. The freedom of speech was increasing. People dared to express their opinions, often opposing Moscow opinions, but they also dared to look for the truth. For example, Jan Procházka, a Czech writer, could say on 14th March the following: “Anyone can afford to say not only what they think, but the truth”. It was the truth of mutual relations between the power elite and the substitution elite.
The interest in public affairs spread nationwide those days. Reform Communists kept their positions being heretic but there was also a big group of so-called non-party politicians. This social fact revived an important category of the democratic political culture, the category of “opposition”.
Opposition in the democratic political system has got not only a control function, but it also enables a possibility to express legally the disagreement with the government policy, and to participate in the competition of gaining positions in the legislative, executive and judicial power in a system. However, such a concept of the role of opposition presupposes the functioning democratic political system. In Czechoslovakia there was not such a presumption in the sixties. In spite of this fact the role of opposition was discussed publicly, even against the will of the Kremlin elite.
There were various ideas of opposition. They could be heard at lots of meetings or gatherings and they could be read in newspapers. For example, V. Havel published a study called To the Topic of Opposition on 4th April 1968 in Literary Newspaper. He suggested a model of two parties as a basis of opposition in the democratic society. Jiří Lederer, a Czech journalist, did not agree with this model in the article Opposition – Illusion and Reality (25th April 1968) because “we have three political parties in our country although each of them affects public affairs differently. How could we put into practice the model of two parties?”
Lederer argumented with his persuasion that most of the society strived for the rehabilitation of socialism and such an orientation could be led in the best way due to the activities of three parties. According to him three parties could do most in the programme as well as opposition competition. He said in his study: “There are two non-Communist parties which have quite a lot of members and which can be alternatives with their own programmes. These programmes can be far more original than Havel formulates for “his” democratic party which could be alternative to the Communist party. I am firmly convinced that Havel’s alternative can be as strong as a debate club despite being a political party. Such a party would be so little active that it could hardly ever become an organization which would be able to play a more important role in the political arena. An anti-Communist programme would be very attractive but Havel is not keen on such a programme (neither am I). Therefore I consider Havel’s thoughts to be speculations which are worth provoking thinking about the fundamental questions of democracy.”
- Lederer had the great expectations of restoring the Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia. On 18th May 1968 Zdeněk Bechyně and Přemysl Janýr (both of them were descendants of leading politicians of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party before the February 1948) handed a letter to the secretary of the chairman of the Central Committee of the National Front, in which they announced the restoration of activities of their party. The following words can be read in the letter: “As resulted from the opinions of members of the Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia and other people, we hereby proclaim that the integration of the Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which was done in 1948 against the will of most members of our party and against its valid organization order, disqualified plenty of real Socialists and Democrats from the political life and contributed to unpleasant effects of last twenty years. We are strongly convinced that the leading role of any political party must be kept by renewing and verifying its attitudes, and that its work must face the attitudes of other groups in the socialistic society. We also claim that these groups must have organization bases for formulation, promotion and defense of their opinions. Therefore the initiative group of members of the Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia decided to form a preparatory committee aimed at the restoration of activities of the party.”
The everyday life in the Czechoslovak society went very freely as though the Moscow supremacy ceased. Alexander Dubček, however, knew about its power. Therefore, being entitled by many heretics, he started to negotiate with the preparatory committee of the Social Democratic Party. He wrote about the negotiations later: “I did not know how we could satisfy Social Democrats without provoking our dogmatic opponents at home and in Moscow. Nevertheless, I did not take any measures to discourage Social Democrats from organizing. I just tried to persuade them to slow down and wait for a more favourable situation.” But it did not come. Neither the Moscow power elite nor the Czech substitution elite surrendered. Dubček had to step back and said the following: Social Democrats seemed to understand me even though we were made to announce publicly in June that we rejected the official restoration of the Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia. We did not take any other official measure against them. As the conflict with the Soviets intensified, our attitudes were cleared up.”
Public affairs were to be kept secret from the public again, the openness of political acting was changing slowly into the forms of the cabinet policy. This negative change affected the controlling as well as the controlled. The headquarters i. e. the Moscow power elite decided to restore its positions in Czechoslovakia with the help of army. However, people did not resign after the events of the 21st August 1968. A wide range of reactions which represented the nationwide movement proved this. The freedom of speech which had become a value of everyday life in the previous six months was supported with the need of moral integrity and the necessity of calling the things with their right names.
The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party joined attitudes like that in the proclamation To All the People of the Czechoslovak Socialistic Republic: The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party considers this act to be the denial of all principles of the relationships among socialistic countries but also the denial of all principles of international law.” The substitution elite stopped considering themselves to be the substitution. However, these who expected themselves to become more dependent on Moscow under pressure of armies and the protection of tanks were not among them.
Restoration of Substitution Elite And Their End
The returning substitution elite represented by G. Husák was agreed and appointed against the will of the whole nation by the Soviet Union with the leader L. Brezhnev. The Czechoslovak “normalization” elite, being the substitution elite, accepted very helpfully the task to minimize conflicts among the Czech public and the consequences of occupation. The political culture of bearers of such tendencies lost the features of democracy or humanity, and became immoral. In their points of view they were “practical”: to get the chance to stay in power (even if substitution) positions.
To be able to perform the task coming from the Kremlin – to keep the certain level of public submission – they had to follow methodological instructions given them by the Kremlin, too. Amitai Etzioni, an American sociologist, characterized a similar methodology with three following categories: violence, reward, authority.
The substitution elite did not hesitate to use the violence, and completely inadequately: the arrest and imprisonment for opinions. They worked as a helpful substitution. Political trials of the seventies and eighties were held by the substitution elite just as their Soviet protectors wished.
One of the first trials was the trial with Milan Hübl, Karel Bartošek and Karel Kyncl. They were accused of “the subversion of the republic”. Milan Hübl was sentenced to six and half a year’s imprisonment. The trial itself was controlled by a judge who had been familiar with the “normalization” methods in advance and humiliated the accused with his arrogance and cynicism. While the Red Right Daily (16th August 1972) spread the information that “the trial conformed with the criminal code and that it complied with all the rules of law, the exile magazine Testimony (1972, vol. 44) brought much more information in detail not only on the trial, but also on the criticism of immoral attitudes of the substitution elite: “The accused behaved bravely… They insisted on their persuasion that they were socialists and communists in opposition and they had wanted to implement their socialistic persuasion. … Jiří Müller said: “I do not think that I did anything anti-socialistic or treasonous, I do just not agree with some aspects of the policy of the governing group which have been implemented since the occupation in August 1968. I object to the policy which is done in compliance with the method that what is not loyal to the official policy is treasonous…”
Normalization power worked with the deterrent effect. Long-lasting punishments were to discourage people from the acts of disagreement with the regime and they were efficient in assuring well-paid positions to the leaders of the substitution elite. The illegal restraint was restored, the level of living at numerous families fell, the level of the whole society decreased – all these aspects helped the substitution elite keep their positions.
The influence of the Soviet occupation intensified with the activities of the substitution elite brought a new element into everyday life. It was corruption, an efficient means of “normalization”. It was successfully implemented very soon after the purge in the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and then also in regional bodies. Those who welcomed the occupation as the “international help” were awarded a 100% pay rise. Those who supported the occupation in the newspapers, on the radio or on the TV could be rewarded 250 % of the salary which had already been risen. This way of “normalizing” affected a great part of Czech and Slovak society. “Bad” people were banned to work in important positions in politics, science and art. “Good” but unqualified, uneducated, unskilled people were welcomed. This led not only to economic losses, but also to cultural and moral decline. Thus the substitution elite lost all the authority as well. A very little part of the society appreciated them.
After establishing Charter 77 the society became convinced that the time had come for asking the following questions: when the armies would leave Czechoslovakia and the quisling substitution elite would be denounced. It was known that neither of these questions would be answered without the participation of Moscow. The occupied nation was encouraged after M. S. Gorbachev became the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He announced that a new way of socialism would be implemented: transformation and new thinking. It is logical that the Czech and Slovak leaders did not accept such a change of political thinking with pleasure. On the contrary, the enthusiastic embrace of M. S. Gorbachev in Czechoslovakia in 1987 could not be missed by the security department of the former government. Alojz Lorenc, the deputy of the Minister of Interior said in his memories: “The will of all the nation was characterized in the best way in the reflection of M. S. Gorbachev’s visit in Prague in 1987. He was received by the people completely differently from the receptions of other Soviet politicians after 1968. … People expected his visit to be a kind of ‘anti-August’.”
Such a situation led to the nationwide persuasion that the “new thinking” proclaimed by Moscow leaders would withdraw the armies soon, and the fundaments of existence of the Czech and Slovak elites would be destroyed. The substitution elite could still rely on the domestic sources as follows: the State Security, People’s Militias, some army brigades and counterintelligence. However, the last remnants of authority of the substitution elite vanished after the exchanges of secretary generals (G. Husák, M. Jakeš, K. Urbánek). These movements were watched by the nation like a comedy. What was left? The final “episode” in which the security squads performed their sad role on the National Street on 17th November 1989. The substitution elite did not represent the interests of the more powerful elite any more, and they lost all their positions in their home country.
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